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CONFEDERATION.

A LETTER

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE EARL OF CARNARVON,

PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

BY

WILLIAM ANNAND, M.P.P.,


FOR THE EAST RIDING OF HALIFAX,

NOVA SCOTIA.

LONDON:

EDWARD STANFORD, 6, CHARING CROSS.

1866.



TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE
THE EARL OF CARNARVON,

PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

MY LORD,

THE Hon. Charles Tupper having made a Speech in your Lordship's presence, and addressed a public letter to you on the subject of Confederation, it is but courteous to him and just to your Lordship that both should be reviewed. In assuming this task it may be proper to explain that I have been for twenty-three years a Member of the Legislature of Nova Scotia—that I represent now the East Riding of the Metropolitan county of Halifax—that, associated with my friend Mr. Howe, I have been sent to this Country to oppose the proposed scheme of Confederation; and that we have been charged to press upon the attention of Her Majesty's Government the addresses of eight of the oldest, most populous and wealthy Counties, whose Electors, convened in open Public Meetings, have prayed the Queen to protect their rights and institutions; and that we are also charged with Petitions to the House of Commons, signed by the great body of the commercial classes in all the chief towns and seaports, by the proprietors of land, by the enrolled militia, and generally by those who have a stake in the country, or a right to exercise the elective franchise.

Mr. Tupper claims to represent the Provincial Government and a majority of the Legislature, and I at once admit that if the Parliament had been elected, and the Government formed, after a fair and full discussion of the Confederation policy at the hustings, his position would be constitutional, his claims legitimate. But he knows that at the last general election the subject of Confederation was never mentioned on a single hustings in the Province—that it was never referred to in

any of the public addresses put forth by leaders of parties—that the elections were run in 1863—that the Quebec Convention did not assemble till the autumn of 1864; and that down to this hour the country at large has not had the opportunity to pronounce a decision in any legal and formal mode (except by petition) on a question the most interesting and important that has ever been presented for consideration since the Colony was founded. He knows that in three large and populous counties, in which elections have been run since the Quebec Scheme was propounded, the Government has been defeated, and their policy voted down by overwhelming majorities. He also knows that, though a vast number of petitions have been presented to the Legislature praying that the Quebec or any other scheme of Confederation should not be adopted, but a single one was presented in its favour; and that a great number of the members who voted for the resolution under which he has come here, were asked by resolutions, passed at public meetings, held in the heart of the counties they misrepresent, and which they dared not attend, to resign their seats because they supported a policy which public opinion in the Province so universally condemned. He also knows that in the Metropolitan and all the other Counties, old party lines have been effaced, and that Conservatives and Liberals, men of all shades of opinion, have combined to oppose this scheme of Confederation; and that they stand prepared to scatter the majority of which he boasts at the elections that by law come off in May next, and to condemn the scheme of Confederation, which I do not believe can be carried in three Counties out of eighteen, if it is fairly presented at the hustings.

With these explanations, your Lordship and the people of England will be able to estimate Mr. Tupper's true position in relation to this question—to determine the value of his representations—the extent of his influence. To make this matter more plain, let me imagine that a General Election had occurred in England three years ago on the ordinary questions

of the day, and that a majority had been secured and a Government formed by either party successful at the polls ;— that long after the election, a measure of a revolutionary character, which had never been propounded at the hustings, was brought forward by the Government, unsustained by petitions from the people ; and that resolutions were, by influence, surprise, corruption, or by any chance combination of parties, passed by the Legislature ;—that the measure was condemned and the Ministry defeated at thirty-six elections ;* and that three millions of people† petitioned the Crown to stay proceedings, until the question was submitted to the electors at the hustings, that they might have an opportunity to overthrow the Ministry, and vindicate their rights and privileges. In what position would any Minister stand who persevered in that policy, and was afraid to appeal to his country, in presence of such a palpable withdrawal of confidence ? Modern England affords no such example, but comparing small things with great, this is exactly the position which Mr. Tupper occupies in Nova Scotia at this moment.

This gentleman has lately written a pamphlet to endeavour to justify his conduct, so filled with irrelevant matter, that persons not very familiar with the history of this question, may not be able to winnow the wheat from the chaff. With your Lordship's permission I will assist them in the task. About three and twenty pages of this pamphlet are made up of extracts from letters and speeches written or made by Mr. Howe, the object being to prove that that gentleman ought to support this scheme of Confederation, and must be very inconsistent if he does not. I may have something to say about these extracts by and bye ; but let us suppose that the collector

* Comparing the number of Members in the House of Commons, with those in the Nova Scotia assembly, a condemnation of Ministers by three constituencies in the latter, is equivalent to thirty-six in the former.

† In proportion to the number who signed the Nova Scotia Petition, relatively to the male adult population of the United Kingdoms.

had been eminently successful, and had proved that Mr. Howe's action had not been consistent, and that he had, informed by circumstances, or by more intense study and investigation of a great public question, changed his opinions, he would only then have proved that Mr. Howe had done what the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Gladstone, and many other eminent men had done before him. Is there a man who has been long in public life, who has not a page or two of Hansard read to him every Session to prove that he has changed or modified his opinions? But the answer given by the House, invariably is, "what have we to do with these criticisms and controversies—what we want to know is, what is right to be done now, with all our lights and experience, with the measure in hand." And so, my Lord, I would urge with all respect, that the question should be tried upon its own merits, and without the slightest regard to what anybody might years ago have said or written. I could fill three pages from the pen of one of the Nova Scotia Delegates, who has come here in Mr. Tupper's train, written a few days before he went to the Convention at Quebec, in which he warned his countrymen against any political union with Canada, and I might, if so disposed, speculate on the causes of his sudden conversion. I might print the speech of another of those Delegates, made only last winter, in which he described the Nova Scotian Ministers with whom he is now associated, as blunderers only fit to be confined in a Lunatic Asylum. But I forbear, for what would all this prove? As respects the questions at issue nothing at all, and Mr. Tupper would better have consulted the taste of this country, and have spared your Lordship's time, had he made his pamphlet twenty pages shorter.

Glancing over these extracts from Mr. Howe's speeches and writings, we are reminded of those rubble walls frequently seen in England; there is fire and some quaint form of beauty in every flint, though one cannot say the same of the mixture of chalk and mud by which they are bound together. What-

ever the subject, there is racy English, energy of thought, and fertility of illustration, in my old friend's utterances, and perhaps we ought to be obliged to the Delegate for stringing them together, even if the structure was not erected for a very legitimate purpose.

Mr. Tupper knows very well that all these extracts were months ago quoted in the Parliamentary Debates, and printed in the Colonial Newspapers, and were triumphantly reconciled by Mr. Howe in a public letter, in which he satisfactorily explained and vindicated his policy in relation to this question. In that defence Mr. Howe proved—

1. That while, since 1850, he had been an ardent advocate of all measures by which the Provinces might be industrially bound together by railroads or other public improvements—while he had favoured emigration and systematic plantation of the poor in the Colonies, and generally all such wise measures of mutual co-operation as had a tendency to elevate and strengthen British America, he had never, during a service of a quarter of a century, contemplated or proposed a political union with Canada, which would overthrow the system of self-government existing in the Maritime Provinces, or give her the unchecked control of their revenues and legislation.

2. That, when the subject was for the first and only time, formally discussed in the Nova Scotia Legislature, while he was in it, Mr. Howe took a directly opposite view, not at all in accordance with Mr. Johnston's and Mr. Tupper's opinions, but in harmony with those propounded in his pamphlet, recently published, "On the Organization of the Empire."

3. That to set the question of Colonial Union, occasionally referred to, at rest, he took powers from the Legislature to discuss it in 1861, with the other Colonial Governments; and that when Delegates from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick met with the Canadian Ministry in September, 1862, it was unanimously decided that even the discussion of the subject was premature, and ought to be indefinitely postponed.

But surely, even if Mr. Howe had expressed opinions ever

so strong in favour of the abstract principle of Union, he would not be bound to accept the Quebec scheme, if he did not approve of it; and he certainly could not have forfeited his right to oppose any scheme which the great majority of his countrymen condemned, and to appeal to the Crown, the Parliament, the Press, and the people of England, to stamp with indignant reprobation the attempt to overthrow the institutions of his country, without giving the people an opportunity to accept or reject a measure of such vital importance.

But Mr. Tupper knows well what has been apparent to everybody, since the delivery of Mr. Howe's speech in 1854, that his policy differs widely from that propounded at the Quebec Convention. That, for the last eleven years, he has been looking hopefully forward to the organization, consolidation, and general defence of the Empire, rather than to its dismemberment. Anybody who reads his pamphlet, and his speech made in 1854, will see that, lifting himself above mere local prejudices and interests, declining to be restrained even by North American obligations, he has all along been looking to the great field of Empire, and calculating how the whole may be so organized and strengthened as to make every part secure and prosperous beyond the possibility of rivalry or aggression.

Mr. Tupper's policy leads directly to dismemberment. If the North American Colonies are to be formed into a nation, why not the West Indian, the Australian, the African, or any other group anywhere else? Then what can you say to India, or even to Ireland? and when all are gone, and all are formed into Republics, for they can be nothing else, then what is to become of England, when the rude impact of half a dozen republics is brought to bear upon her democratic elements, varied interests, and great wealth; who can foresee what will come next? The picture is not pleasant to contemplate, and we had better postpone this sorry business of new nation making till we ascertain if something much safer and more rational cannot be done.

But Mr. Tupper leaves us in doubt as to the status which he designs for the Confederacy. He reasons as though it was still to be a Colony, "under the ægis of Great Britain." Lord Monck calls it "a New Nation"—"a fresh Power."

Now this point should be settled before a single step is taken—the views of the Maritime Provinces and of Canada and the Governor-General reconciled. If British America is to be a nation, she must have an Executive and a Parliament, with plenary powers and the management of her Foreign Affairs. If she has not she will be at best a great unwieldy Colony. If she has, will Great Britain form with her a treaty offensive and defensive, and, risking the perils of her crude diplomacy, agree to defend her against all the world? I do not believe she will. And if she does not, then the inevitable results of the change must be apparent to all the world; before long the frontier will be rubbed out, and the Provinces will be incorporated into the United States.

Belgium is not more completely at the mercy of France than this feeble new nation will be at the mercy of the United States, the moment that the moral obligations and protecting power of Great Britain are withdrawn. Belgium has this advantage, that she is surrounded by other Great Powers which have an interest in her separate existence, and who are naturally jealous of the preponderating influence of France in the counsels of Europe. Behind and around this new nation across the sea are no other powers to which she can appeal for protection, and which are interested in arresting the process of absorption. She must stand naked and alone in presence of the great Republic, with eight times her strength, from the moment that she ceases to be an integral part of the British Empire; and when she assumes that attitude she can no longer claim, nor can she command, the security which she now derives from the diplomatic influence and material strength of this country. Great Britain is now bound by every honourable obligation to defend the Provinces as they

stand, as long as they are loyal, and expend their means and blood in their own defence. But will the people of England do this when we are a Nation? We shall see.

There is one aspect of this question that Mr. Tupper veils with great care, and which every confederate writer and speaker endeavours to throw discreetly in the shade. In Canada there always existed two parties—one which advocates high protective duties against Great Britain and all the rest of the world, and another which always votes away the public money with lavish and often reckless prodigality. These two parties work out common results, an empty treasury, an annually expanding debt, and a high tariff. Within the last ten years, certain manufactures have sprung up, and woollen cloths, blankets, paper, refined sugar, spirits, types, cottons, linens, iron and brass ware, and a variety of other articles are manufactured in Canada, under cover of these high duties. The people of England take from Canada all her staples—wheat, flour, corn, timber, pearl ashes, &c. free of duty, and yet have to pay heavily to get their manufactures into the Province in return. This is bad enough, and has excited in all the manufacturing towns of England, for several years, loud complaints, which often swell into an indignant clamour to throw off the Colony altogether.

The Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland have, so far, lived under low tariffs, being content to extend their cultivation—to work their mines—to build ships, catch and cure fish, and enlarge their mercantile marine. They live by pursuits which require no protection, and as they only burthen their trade with low revenue duties that everybody pays, they have prospered under a simple system which, in this country, has never provoked a murmur. All the articles that I have enumerated, and a great many more, such as cutlery, crockery ware, dry goods, which are consumed in the Maritime Provinces, come from England, and have for the last century.

Under the system as it stands the manufacturer in England

and the manufacturer in Canada present themselves in the markets of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, on a fair and equal footing. Both must pay the low revenue duties required to support the Governments, but neither have an advantage, and the consumer has the privilege to buy what he wants from either, protected by the most perfect fair play and the freest competition. Now Mr. Tupper professes to be a great free trader, and is anxious to break down the intercolonial custom-houses. Let us see how matters will stand the moment that this is done. Is it not clear that the Canadian manufacturer will command the markets in all the Maritime Provinces, and that the British manufacturer will be shut out? The custom-house is to be broken down for Jean Baptiste, but John Bull, whose blood and money conquered Canada, whose energy and enterprize founded the Maritime Provinces, and have sustained and protected them to this hour, must take his hat off to a custom-house officer the moment he enters a seaport of the Confederacy, and pay his 15, 20, or 25 per cent. before he can land an article; and then he must compete with goods, brought round the seaboard he protects, or over the railroad he has assisted to build, which enter into consumption, paying no duty at all.

Here are the naked facts. Let the merchants and manufacturers of the three kingdoms investigate the truth of my statements, which cannot be shaken—let the tax-payers ponder the matter—let the members of both Houses see to it that they do not sanction such injustice to their constituents; and perhaps your Lordship would do well, at all events, to keep yourself unpledged till those who have the deepest interest in the contemplated changes have been heard, through the commercial organizations, who will probably have something to say as soon as the question is clearly understood. That the people of England may consent to be thus driven out of the markets of the Maritime Provinces, and to hand over their consumption to the manufacturers of Canada, is just possible,

but when this is done they will hardly be so simple as to defend them.

Let us imagine a cartoon for Punch, with John Bull on the outside of the "New Nationality," paying his 15 or 25 per cent., with a sharp Canadian inside distributing his goods free of duty, but clapping John Bull on the back, and exclaiming, "You must defend us, old fellow;" or another, with a Nova Scotian Delegate in the character of Jeremy Diddler, having the Intercolonial Railway in his eye, slyly asking our good humoured national representative, "Have you got an odd four millions about you?" The inevitable and very appropriate answer would be in the language of the play—"Yes, and I mean to keep them about me."

But it may be said that Mr. Galt has this year reduced the ad-valorem duties of Canada to 15 per cent. He did, with the probable design to wheedle the Maritime Provinces into this Confederacy and to conciliate public opinion in this country, until the measure was passed. But who does not know that the duties must come up again the moment the Confederacy is formed? When the intercolonial duties which all the Provinces now pay are taken off, the imposts charged on all commerce from abroad must be increased to make up the deficit. These will be paid largely by Great Britain and by all the other British Colonies and Dependencies, which will then stand, commercially, in the relation of foreign states. But besides, the moment we become a nation, we must have an army and a navy, and all the trappings of a Court, and therefore we shall be very lucky indeed if we can keep our ad-valorem duty down to 25 per cent. But whatever it is, one thing is perfectly clear, that the higher it rises the better for the Canadian manufacturer and the worse for the English. Even if our old friend John Bull were simple enough to surrender three good markets, and to give the Canadians the benefit of this discriminating duty against his own industry of 15 per cent., another turn of the screw would exhaust his patience, and then Mr. Tupper and his friends would be left nearly as defenceless as Indians, all war-paint and feathers,

in presence of a power that would probably give them the full benefit of high protective duties before all was done.

The speech made by Mr. Tupper at the Albion Tavern is more remarkable for what it omits, than for what it includes. What Burns calls "the better art of hiding," is one rarely forgotten in discussing the subject of Confederation. Let me, however, examine what was said.

We were told that the North-American Provinces, "so richly endowed by nature, ought to be in the very highest state of prosperity." Your Lordship showed that they were. The statistics of the Provinces support the statement. In a Report made by Sir Gaspard Le Marchant to the Colonial Office in 1853, it was proved that in crops of wheat, rye, oats, buckwheat, barley, hay, and potatoes, and in the production of butter and cheese, Nova Scotia beat half the States of the Union.

Turning from agriculture to navigation, the fact is now established that the people of Nova Scotia, to say nothing of boats and small craft that swarm around our shores, own more than a ton of registered shipping for every man, woman, and child in the Province, having, in less than 120 years, in proportion to numbers, beaten every other maritime people upon the face of the globe, those of the United States included.

We have in the digest appended to the last decennial census of Canada, proof that, during the last twenty years, that Province has made industrial progress with a rapidity equal to that of the neighbouring United States.

Mr. Tupper points to the fiscal system of the United States as the great source of their prosperity, and desires to copy it, but omits to tell us that the system includes a high protective tariff, injurious to the commerce of foreign states, and burthensome to consumers within their own territory. He knows that all the luxuries that the rich enjoyed, all the necessities that the middle classes and poor consumed, except staple articles of food, cost, even before the war, from twenty to thirty per cent more in the United States than in the Pro-

vinces. Why was this? Because everybody who produced anything that might by possibility come from abroad, taxed everybody else. Now if this is a good system, by all means let it be adopted over the whole Empire. But if it is not, why should it be forced upon three unwilling Provinces, eminently commercial and attached to principles of free trade, for the advantage of another Province, which, under cover of the high tariffs forced upon her by a too lavish expenditure, has already bolstered up some manufacturing establishments which are afraid of fair competition. What we propose to do, says Mr. Tupper, "is to sweep away our Tariffs and Custom-Houses," and the sentence supplies another illustration of the assertion that language was given to us to conceal our thoughts. The speaker knew very well, what is not so extensively known in England as it shall be, that the Custom Houses and Tariffs in the five Provinces are not to be swept away, but are to remain, and that, as I have already shown, every pound's worth of goods manufactured in these islands, will be taxed before it can pass the charmed circle of the Confederation, while the manufactures of Canada may circulate freely over all the Provinces; and this, bear in mind, while the people to be thus taxed are to defend the countries from which they are to be excluded, and to supply millions of money to build railroads, dig canals, purchase lands, and extend this system for the benefit of the Canadians, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

The Government of England may, in hot haste, consent to sanction this policy, but I hope not. A year ago the House of Commons, not clearly apprehending what was meant, might, in a moment of languor or indifference, have passed a measure of this kind; but before it meets again the subject will have been aired, and understood, and when the practical sound sense of the British people has been brought to bear upon it, they will, or I am much mistaken, take one of two lines. They will say emphatically, "We cannot afford to make new nations out of the fragments of the British Empire," or they will say, "Erring children go in peace—try what experiments

you like, adopt any form of government you please, but do not expect that we who are to be taxed at every Custom House in the five Provinces, as if we were foreigners, while you exchange with each other what you manufacture, are to bear the burden of your defence."

But will the people of England be the only persons unfairly treated by these arrangements? The West Indies, with whom the Maritime Provinces have had a profitable commerce for more than a century, will be outside. Portugal, the Mediterranean Ports, the Brazils, Central and South America, the great markets for our staples, will be outside. India, Australia, the Mauritius, Ceylon, and all the other great provinces and dependencies of the Empire, with which our clipper ships carry on a mutually advantageous traffic, under an enlightened system, will be outside. The Maritime Provinces are even now preparing to take advantage of the opening of China and Japan — of the new Commercial Treaties with France and Austria; and as Italy, Prussia, and Spain, become better organised and more commercial, our merchants and mariners will explore every port upon their sea coast, every channel of their industry. With such boundless fields before us, and the open markets of this country, what do we care for the consumption of two or three millions of people who live in the rear, and why should we permit them, for their own advantage, to cripple our trade with hundreds of millions of people who are as much our brethren and fellow subjects as they are, and with all the world besides?

But if a free interchange of manufactures among the Provinces be a good thing and the people of this country raise no objections to it, what hinders the Provinces from adopting that system now without any Confederation? The Governments have got the power to frame a measure and their Legislature to pass it, as they have done other measures providing for the free interchange of staples, and for the adoption of a uniform system of postage.

Let me now turn your Lordship's attention for a few mo-

ments to Mr. Tupper's military statistics. He says—"If the different Provinces were united into one state, they would be enabled, should their lives and liberties be threatened, to bring into the field from 400,000 to 600,000 able-bodied men, trained to the use of arms." That there are half a million of men capable of bearing arms in the five Provinces is perfectly true. It is also true that no finer raw material of which to make soldiers exists in the world, and that with any reasonable chance of success these men, conducting a defensive warfare, would make for their homes and institutions a gallant fight. While the flag of England waves over their heads the Queen's name is a tower of strength. When war comes they know it is a National War, and that the injuries they suffer and the blows they receive will be retaliated upon their enemies with interest elsewhere. But let Lord Monck organize them into a "New Nationality," and tell them they must defend it under such skilful military administrators as are described to us in the Canadian papers, or such provident Commanders as the Fenians met at Ridgway, and let Great Britain send them into a hopeless contest with eight to one against them, shall we then have any assurance that they will fight at all? I must confess that I have grave doubts upon the subject; and the sooner that the logical results, certain to flow from this absurd policy of new nation-making is understood in England, the sooner will we try back to the sounder thought of our ancestors, to build up a great Empire by valour and enterprize, and defend it come what may.

Fortunately for us we have the experience of the United States to guide us in balancing military forces and counting the cost of war. In looking at our Colonial Army, let us not deceive ourselves. Of Mr. Tupper's half million of men, there are certainly not more than fifty thousand who can be fairly claimed to be "trained" soldiers. Not five hundred of these have ever been under fire. A year's training is required to make an infantry soldier in the British service, and when he is equipped and turned out he has cost £100 sterling. To put

his half million of "trained" men into the field even after the British mode, Mr. Tupper would require, to say nothing of the additional cost of cavalry, artillery, ambulances, pontoons, and other indispensable requirements of an Army, just £50,000,000 sterling. But men are worth more in America than they are in Europe, as the United States found out to their cost. They often had to pay \$1000 per man for recruits, for the raw material, before they began to train them; and only last session Congress was compelled to vote \$200,000,000 to equalize the bounties: that is, to enable the Government to pay those who bore the heat and burthen of the day, the amount exacted by others who entered the vineyard of death at the eleventh hour. Assuming that Mr. Tupper's forces are as patriotic and as fond of fighting as President Lincoln's were, and that he only pays half the bounty, then he will require about £50,000,000 more for the raw material of his Army before the rather expensive process of making soldiers of them begins. He must have a hundred millions sterling, bear in mind, before he can realize the boast made at the Albion; and, as all the male population will be required to make up his army, there will be nobody but women and children left to till the fields until the war is over. A hundred millions is a serious sum. Where is it to come from? I think it will puzzle the orator to find it in the Maritime Provinces; and as to Canada, is it not notorious that last Session, Mr. Galt, wanting only £1,000,000 sterling to keep up her credit, and being unable to borrow it in the Provinces, in England, or the United States, was compelled to resort to a most questionable experiment and seize upon the circulation of the Banks to supply the necessities of the Government? Let it not be supposed that I am speaking without book of the finances of Canada. The *New York Albion*, a paper of the highest respectability, moderate in tone, and for forty-four years the consistent advocate of British interests, on the 15th of September last, published the following editorial, which ought to be read by Her Majesty's Ministers and

by the Members of both Houses of Parliament, before they consent to assume the responsibility of making a Colony so financially crippled into a Nation; and before they consent to hand over the prosperous Maritime Provinces to the dominion of a people without an Army or a Navy, and who, but a short time ago, could only borrow £50,000 at eight per cent.—and whose finances have been so mismanaged, as to extort from the only British organ in the United States the mournful acknowledgment, that a Fenian conquest, or absorption into the Republic, must be the inevitable result of conduct so reckless and improvident:—

“We regret to say, that the official correspondence, now published for the first time, forces us to the conclusion, that the management of the Finance Minister of Canada during the past year has been wanting in every principle of financial skill, and has unfortunately proved exceedingly detrimental to the best interests of Canada. In fact, we are surprised to learn now that the Province has been kept so long in ignorance of its financial position, and cannot blame one man wholly, but rather hold the entire Ministry, who allowed the credit of the Province to be thus wantonly squandered, in part responsible.

“It appears from the record that Mr. Galt writes to the London agents—Messrs. Baring Brothers, and Glyn, Mills, and Co.—under date, 14th August, 1865, desiring to change “the arrangement” then existing (which was, that these firms should sell Canadian securities then in their hands at 90), substituting therefor “a loan temporary of £760,000 sterling, for a period of not less than one or more than two years, on deposits of Provincial bonds as they (the agents) might consider necessary.

“In the same letter the Messrs. Glyns and Barings are informed that £200,000 sterling of the amount required, falls due to the Bank of Montreal on the 19th of the ensuing month, and that accordingly an *immediate answer* is necessary. This was certainly a very exceptionable method of opening a delicate financial negotiation; particularly when we read in the agents’ letter of November 25th, as follows: ‘You will allow us to call to your recollection that we had been led to expect that provision would have been made in Canada for the funds required here.’

"We cannot wonder that Canadian credit suffered in Lombard Street, when the process was suddenly reversed, and the London agents were called upon to provide means for paying off the provincial creditor. Neither can we blame the London creditor for asking at once for "an order in council, legally binding the government for the payment of the interest and principal," nor for further adding tartly, that 'it is, of course, understood that the Bank of Montreal will not be repaid while our two firms remain in advance. * * We deeply regret that to maintain your engagements you should be constrained to attempt to borrow in this market at a time so unfavourable; but if such an unfortunate case must be resorted to, we shall endeavour to follow your orders. We take due note that you will make timely remittances to secure the punctual payment of the dividend due on the 1st of January next.'

"This was language calculated to arouse indignation in a sensible if not a sensitive man, and if addressed to a New York merchant in place of an Honourable Finance Minister of a proud and prosperous Province, it would have had that effect. But not so with the pliant—or shall we say the pusillanimous—Ministry. The order in Council was duly forwarded, when still plainer language was used by the financial gentlemen of London, which runs as follows: 'We must repeat that we see no prospect whatever of our being able to make arrangements on the conditions authorized for the settlement of the amount due to the Bank of Montreal, as well as for our advances, *and we shall, therefore, be glad to hear from you what measures the Government propose to adopt to cover our accounts;*' adding again, 'we have no doubt that you are also preparing to make remittances for the dividends due in January.'

"In reply to this Mr. Galt actually condescends to the position of bankrupt debtor, and proffers "a statement" of his affairs thus: "Our engagements consist of about £500,000 sterling, due to yourselves, to be covered positively at 31st December next, and £200,000 sterling to the Bank of Montreal, to be covered at 17th instant, and we have also to provide £300,000 for the January dividends." And then goes on to say: "I am now authorized by the order in Council, to request you to make arrangement for the desired loan of seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds, *at such rate of interest and for such period as the state of the money market*

may permit. * * I need scarcely add that it will cause very serious inconvenience if any disappointment should again arise." After making sales under these instructions to the limited extent of £50,000 only, the agents report again that 'the operation has proved to be one of the greatest difficulty, and demonstrates, as it is our duty to observe, that *Canada must not depend upon temporary expedients, but upon its own resources.*'

"Now, after candidly considering all this correspondence, we cannot but view the proceeding as most unpardonable on the part of both Mr. Galt and the Ministry who took part in it. We refrain from going on still further to show how the London firms insisted upon the small loans, finally raised at 8 per cent., not being used exclusively to pay the Bank of Montreal, but *proportionately* between themselves and the Bank, as it is really too humiliating to publish. One thing is certain, however, that should Canadian affairs not be more wisely managed financially, in future, than they have been in the immediate past, the province might as well fall into the hands of the Fenians first as last; for absorption, or entire dependence on some more ambitious and self-reliant nation, will be its inevitable doom."

Let any English gentleman peruse this article, and then say whether the people of the Maritime Provinces are not guided by something more than instinct in their determination to maintain their Imperial relations, and keep clear of reckless and improvident politicians who will exhaust their revenues, multiply their taxes, and then drag them into connexions from which they are now free, but which the Editor of the *Albion* plainly tells us are the results of the financial policy he so graphically describes.

Mr. Tupper thinks that people should always be consistent. Perhaps they should. Let me try him by his own rule. The last legacy which Mr. Howe's government left to Nova Scotia was an improved Militia law, under which 50,000 men have been enrolled, embodied and partially trained. In 1862, in consequence of a temporary loss of revenue arising out of the Civil War in the United States and the blockade of the

Southern seaboard, as Finance Minister of the Province I proposed for one year to raise the 10 per cent. ad valorem duty to 12½. This was done—the revenue came up—the treasury overflowed—the policy was successful, and the following year the additional 2½ per cent was taken off. Under the fiscal system which Mr. Howe's government left behind it, Mr. Tupper has had an overflowing revenue ever since he came into office. Yet, to purchase a poor popularity, the gentleman who now thinks we are sufficiently advanced to make a new Nation, and to lift our duties to 15, 20, or 25 per cent, actually opposed this moderate increase for a single year, declared that we had already reached the maximum of taxation, that the Province was on the eve of bankruptcy, and actually won the position he now occupies by propounding a scheme of retrenchment and economy, which, when the elections were over, he never attempted to carry out.

Again, in the estimate for 1862, there was the very moderate addition to the Militia grant of £2,400 sterling. Mr. Tupper, who is now going to put half a million of men into the field at a cost of £100,000,000 sterling, actually moved to strike out the vote, on the ground that the Province could not afford it. With these facts before them the people of England will perhaps come to the conclusion that Mr. Tupper is not exactly the person to upbraid any one with a want either of patriotism or consistency.

It is time, my Lord, that more correct views prevailed upon a subject of Imperial as well as Colonial interest—that the governing classes here and the representatives of public opinion in the British North American Provinces should express their opinions frankly and without reserve, neither deceiving themselves nor misleading each other.

When the scheme for Confederating the Provinces of British North America was first announced, in the autumn of 1864, the press and people of England, surprised and gratified at the unanimity exhibited at the Quebec Convention, welcomed the measure with an amount of favour rarely accorded to

matters of colonial concern. Little or no inquiry was made as to the merits of the scheme—whether it was calculated to materially benefit the several Provinces, or as to its probable, though perhaps remote, effects upon the Empire at large. It was quite enough that a measure prepared by a Convention, said to represent all parties and opinions in the five Provinces, and recommended by the Governor-General, should receive a warm and hearty assent. But there were other reasons. The Anti-Colonial party—those who look upon Colonies as costly incumbrances, and who would circumscribe the boundaries of this noble Empire to the narrow limits of two small islands—these men hailed the Confederation scheme as the first instalment of their possibly well-meant but suicidal policy: the cutting adrift of the most valuable Colonies of the Crown, careless whether they formed themselves into a “New Nationality,” or were absorbed by the United States. In addition to this active and talented, though perhaps not very powerful party, the public at large welcomed British American Confederation as a remedial measure—one that would throw the chief burthens of defence upon the Colonists themselves, and largely reduce the taxes paid by the people of England. But while differing as to the larger policy whether the Confederacy should form new relations, or continue a dependency of the Crown, both parties agreed in this: that the Provinces, when united, would assume a large share of the taxation hitherto chargeable upon the Imperial exchequer. This view, however sound, is not shared by the people of the Provinces. On the contrary, the scheme of Confederation has been urged by its advocates as the only means by which large sums of money could be borrowed in this country, under the guarantee of the Imperial Government.

Confederation in Canada means the loan of immense sums of British capital for the purpose of digging new canals and enlarging old ones, for the purchase of lands, opening up new territories for settlement, during the expenditure of which everybody expects to make himself rich and independent. It

means also new markets for her manufactures, and control over the legislation, the taxation and the revenues, of the Maritime Provinces. The New Brunswickers were promised the Inter-Colonial Railway, the expenditure of three millions of pounds sterling, and the opening up of the waste lands of the Province. They were also promised the markets of Canada and the other Provinces for their manufactures, but never a word was said about the Confederacy assuming the burthen of their own defences, and relieving the tax-payers of this country. On the contrary, the assent of that Province was obtained upon the oft repeated public pledges of Mr. Tilley, the leader of the Government, that the taxation of the people would not be increased, and that instead of receiving less, they would have more money than at present for their local improvements.

A similar line of argument was pursued in Nova Scotia. A "Union Manifesto" was issued early in the winter of 1865, under the auspices of Mr. Tupper and his co-delegates, in which, after contrasting the Tariffs of Canada and Nova Scotia, it is said—"If the project of a Union of the Provinces were rejected in Nova Scotia, and with it the terms for securing an Inter-Colonial Railway, we see no prospect of its ever being constructed." And speculating upon the advantages of Union with Canada, the writer holds out the idea that low as the taxation then was (estimated at \$2.60 a head), it would soon be reduced even below that amount, when the Provinces were confederated. And Mr. Archibald, the then leader of the Opposition in the Assembly, now a co-delegate of Mr. Tupper, at a large public meeting held at Halifax in December 1864, in expounding the financial aspects of Confederation, remarked that \$1,000,000, £200,000 sterling, would be considered "a fair discharge of our duty to England" for "Military Defences," and went on to say, that the taxation would only be increased from \$2.60 to \$3 per *capita*, which would secure, besides the Inter-Colonial Railway, a Railway to Pictou, another to Annapolis, and also free trade in manufactures with the neighbouring Provinces. And then he triumphantly asked, "Is

there a man in this entire audience who will stand up and say that he is not willing to have these advantages in return for a tax of 40 cents a head."

I have now, my Lord, made it abundantly clear that the views entertained in England and in the Provinces are diametrically opposed to each other—that while the people of this country expect to be relieved of a large amount of taxation when the Provinces are confederated, the Resolutions authorizing the present Delegation have been carried in the several Colonial Legislatures upon the expressed understanding that the local expenditure for defence shall not exceed \$1,000,000 a year, that the Imperial Government will provide the rest, and assist besides in borrowing such sums of money as may be demanded for building railways, digging canals, and purchasing large tracts of territory. The Parliament and people of England may do this, but let them do it with their eyes open, and with a full knowledge of the influences at work on the other side of the water.

There are some other points which should be clearly understood. Confederation, it is said, is necessary if not indispensable to uniformity of fiscal and trade relations in the Provinces. This is a mistake. All the alleged advantages of Confederation may be easily obtained without depriving the Maritime Provinces of their rights of self-government and the privileges they now enjoy. The average of the tariffs, upon the authority of Mr. Galt, at the close of 1864, was, Canada 20 per cent., Nova Scotia 10, New Brunswick 15½, Newfoundland 11, and Prince Edward Island 10 per cent. Canada has since reduced her *ad valorem* duties to 15 per cent. but those of the other Provinces remain the same. It is evidently unjust to the manufacturers of this country that even a duty of 10 per cent. should be enforced upon the products of their industry, but, assuming that that amount is required for revenue purposes, there would be no difficulty in assimilating the tariffs, were Canada and New Brunswick only willing to reduce their imposts upon British goods. It does not require

Confederation to do this, and the only chance of its ever being done is to leave the Provinces as they are. With a Canadian majority controlling the legislation of all British America it is evident that the tariff, instead of coming down to the Maritime level, must very soon go up to the standard which may be adopted by the manufacturers and protectionists of Canada.

Then it is said that the Provinces cannot have free trade with each other unless they confederate. This, too, is a delusion. The Provinces at this moment have the most perfect free trade with each other, in all the products of the soil, the sea, the forest, and the mine, in every thing but manufactured goods, which require skilled labour, and upon which they charge the same duties as are levied upon the manufactures of this country. These staples, which the Mother Country has not got to send, it is fair thus to exchange—but is it fair to exchange manufactures in the same way—to discriminate, in favour of the Canadian manufacturer and against the English by a duty even of 15 per cent. ? And if this is done, surely, my Lord, nobody out of Bedlam can believe that the Parliament of England will consent to vote money to build railroads through the country that thus discriminates against British industry, and to defend it in war, as if it were an integral portion of the Empire.

A uniform system of Letter, Book and Parcel Postage, prevails in all the Provinces now. There is, however, this difference between them:—Canada imposes a duty upon Newspapers, which are untaxed in the Maritime Provinces, the feeling of the latter being to afford the people the means of information at the least possible cost, and not to look to the Post-office as a source of revenue. But it surely does not require a costly and cumbrous system of Administration, with the addition of two more Governments to the five already in existence, to bring about any of the changes referred to, including an assimilation of the Currencies, which might be arranged in a week by the Financial Secretaries of the several Provinces, if Canada would only

approach the subject in a spirit of compromise and fair play.

Then we are told that the Provinces cannot successfully defend themselves unless they confederate. This, too, is a mistake. English Military authorities are divided in opinion as to whether Canada can be defended at all, and those who take the most favourable view of the subject only assume that an enemy, from the American side, can be kept in check by the Colonial Militia, with the aid of British troops stationed in Canada, and the expenditure of a large amount of money in fortifications and entrenched camps, until the arrival of reinforcements from England. The Americans, on the other hand, ridicule the idea of her being successfully defended. But be that as it may, it does not very clearly appear that the Provinces, in whole or in part, would be more invulnerable if Confederated than they are now. Union is not always strength, and so I fear it will turn out if the Provinces are politically united. Union would be strength for defensive purposes if it brought more men, which are the material of war—it would be strength if it brought more money, which is the sinew of war; but when the length of frontier is largely increased, without adding either to the number of men, or to the amount of money, it would appear that union is only another name for weakness. The case is very well put in a volume, the production of two Military gentlemen,* who have travelled through the Provinces, and are familiar with their geographical position.

“The Lower Provinces see in Confederation an incorporation of their easily defensible selves with a vast conglomeration of provinces occupying, taken as a whole, the most unfavourable geographical position in the world. The inhabitants of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward’s Island may with reason think twice before sanctioning the removal of their Government and Legislature to a country which, as many English writers have

* The Confederation of British North America, by E. C. Bolton, and H. H. Webber, Royal Artillery. Chapman and Hall, 193, Piccadilly, 1866.

demonstrated, is totally incapable of self-defence. They are justified in saying, we would rather remain small but secure, than become part and parcel of a Confederation, whose largest portion must be noted for its insecurity. There is no idle jealousy in this feeling. It is totally apart from any reflections on the political character of Canadians. It is simply a geographical consideration, and, since it is difficult to overcome geography, is one deserving of every attention. Canada is so situated, that an invasion of her shores would doubtless be supported by every prospect of success. Equally certain is it, that the inhabitants of Prince Edward's Island and Nova Scotia have never given to the fear of invasion a moment's thought. It may be selfish of these provinces to value the security afforded by their geographical position. It might be nobler, were there any cause for so doing, to throw in their lot with their Canadian cousins. As there is no necessity for this, however, since 3,000,000 Canadians would not be materially strengthened by an additional population of 600,000 men and a largely-increased frontier, the selfishness of the Lower Provinces is by no means clearly proved. Were it possible to imagine ourselves in a similar position, how should we act? Were it proposed that England should enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with a nation whose situation rendered all hope of resisting invasion vain; were we asked to make her seat of Government ours—to move our Legislature to an insecure spot within her borders—to exchange London for a city which, in the event of war, could not pretend to security, and which our whole available force could not make secure from occupation by the enemy—should we not scout the notion as ridiculous, whatever advantages, commercial or financial, might be offered in exchange? Yet those who are most ready to admit the impossibility of a successful resistance to invasion on the part of Canada, are most earnest for a Confederation of the provinces which, for an increase of military power to Canada, is useless. Geography would forbid mutual aid from one province to the other. The troops of the Lower Provinces could never assist Canada, and in time of invasion it were impossible for Canadians to protect the Lower Provinces. It were idle to imagine that Nova Scotia and New Brunswick could afford troops for the defence of Toronto, were that town attacked. Apart from the improbability of that city ever being reached, their services would be required at home. Were the proposed general Government at Ottawa to pass an Act mobi-

lising the militia of New Brunswick, and order a portion of it to undergo the dangers of march along the Canadian frontier, that Hamilton or even Montreal might be reinforced, would not a refusal of the New Brunswickers to exchange a strong position around their homes for a weak one in a distant land be justified both by patriotism and common sense? Again, it is very doubtful whether in times of peace the militia organization of the Lower Provinces would be improved by the removal of head-quarters to Ottawa. For all practical purposes the various provincial militias are at present as much under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of British North America as they possibly could be. The advantages to accrue from the administration of detail in these corps by offices removed from them 800 or 1000 miles is not apparent. Since it is an open question whether a British army of 100,000 men could protect the Canadian frontier, it is evident that when with all our power we might expect to fail, the Lower Provinces can hardly be expected to succeed.

"Union is not always strength. Our union with Canada is not a source of strength to us, and we are aware that such is the case. Yet Canada is, virtually, as far from the Lower Provinces as from England. It is not the Atlantic Ocean which renders Canada an untenable position for British troops. The frozen gulf, the wilderness between New Brunswick and Canada, and the vastness and length of the Canadian frontier are the real sources of her weakness and that of those provinces to which she is attached.

"No people was ever so unfortunately situated as regards defence as are the Canadians. No country except Canada is *one-sided*. She has a front but no back. Her population does not extend in many parts further into the interior than is covered by red paint on the map. Beyond this there is nothing—no sea, no land fit for settlement—nothing to show that in process of time an increase of population can be expected. The small existing stream of emigration flows westwards. The further we go west the thinner we find is the population.

"The strength of British North America is that of a fishing-rod. A serviceable policeman's baton could be made from the butt end, whilst the further we reach towards the point weaker and weaker does it become. The further westward we go, the weaker becomes the defensive power of our North American possessions. The Lower Provinces are the butt end of the rod. Quebec may repre-

sent the first joint, Montreal the second, and Niagara the third. The point at this moment rests at Windsor, opposite Detroit, and is easily to be discerned by the map, pressing directly against the populous state of Michigan. Here the Canadian railways end. Those of the United States extend westward and north-westward of Windsor for 700 or 800 miles. To carry out this simile a little further: Apart from all danger of a fracture by a force applied to its centre, the fishing-rod has pressing upon its point a very strong resisting power, lying west and north-west. In plain words, over and above all danger of lateral invasion from the States lying south, the Canadian flank is liable to be turned, or, to speak more correctly, its western point broken by the crushing American power which overhangs and surrounds the westernmost settled districts.

"A further increase of frontier only makes matters worse. The addition of the Hudson's Bay territory renders Canada, if possible, weaker than before. The United States have already got 700 or 800 miles start of her, an advantage which it is impossible for Canada to overcome. However far westward Canadian settlements may extend, those of the States must always extend hundreds of miles further in the same direction. Thus, however thickly settled the Canadian frontier may become, its flank can always be turned by the railways and civilisation overlapping its most western parts."

The British North American Provinces, for purposes of defence, are Confederated now, the Imperial Government being the central authority, and armed with power to concentrate the Militia upon any point which the Commander-in-Chief, with the assent of the local Governments, may select. But even without that authority the Provinces, in their present separate condition, would, if the necessity arose, volunteer and make common cause with each other, as Nova Scotia did, when New Brunswick was threatened with invasion by the State of Maine; and we have yet to learn that aid will be tendered as cheerfully should the Maritime Provinces be coerced into a union so repugnant to their feelings, so fatal to their interests. The late Duke of Newcastle, who personally visited the Provinces, and knew them intimately and well, thus

recorded his opinion,—that political union was not necessary to command mutual aid and co-operation were any of the Colonies attacked. At the close of a very able despatch to Lord Monck, in August, 1862, upon the defences of Canada, His Grace remarks:—"The political union of the North American Colonies has often been discussed. The merits of the measure, and the difficulties in the way of its accomplishment, have been well considered; but none of the objections which oppose it seem to impede a union for defence."

It is quite right, my Lord, that the British North American Provinces, one and all, should contribute a reasonable amount towards the defence of the Empire, consistent with their growth and development, as young and comparatively poor communities, sparsely populated. Nor must it for a moment be supposed, that those who oppose Confederation are actuated by any narrow or sordid desire to escape from the payment of a claim, which they all feel to be due to the people of this country. On the contrary, Nova Scotians would consider it a matter of pride to contribute pound for pound with Canadians to uphold the national flag, and maintain the integrity of the Empire. And what is more, they have yet to learn that their ability would be increased by annexation to a Colony of more than doubtful credit, whose public men have been noted for waste and extravagance, and whose bonds are quoted, day after day, upon the Stock Exchange, at 6 per cent below those of their own Province.

Then we are told that the Inter-Colonial Railway, which is represented as if it were a boon only to the Maritime Provinces, cannot be had unless they confederate with Canada. The Duke of Newcastle, when he promised to furnish the money, affixed no such condition to the grant. The proportions each Province was to pay were arranged at Quebec in September, 1862; the conditions on which the Imperial Government offered the guarantee were accepted by Mr. Howe and Mr. Tilley at the close of that year, and the

Railway would now have been built if the Canadian Delegates had not refused to provide a sinking fund for the repayment of their portion of the loan. The Railway, however much it may be desired by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, is not necessary to their existence. They are bounded by the open sea, and have access to every part of the globe at all seasons of the year. The case is very different with Canada. With her ports closed by ice for five months, she is cut off from all communication with the outer world, with which she has communication only, during all that time, through a foreign territory. It is clear, then, that Canada is in the condition of the owner of a valuable estate living beside an uncertain and not very reliable neighbour, who at certain seasons of the year may confine him within the limits of his own domain, neither permitting him to buy or sell where he likes, or even to visit his distant friends. The Railway, then, which would enable the Canadian to escape from this state of thralldom, is a measure of prime necessity, indispensable to his security, his dignity, and independence. This was frankly admitted, in the session of 1865, by prominent members of the Canadian Parliament. Colonel Haultain, supporter of the Government, said :—

“ We must have that (the Railroad), and pay for it whether we have political union or not. It was needed for commercial, social, and defensive purposes.”

Mr. Rose, also a supporter of the Ministry, who sits for Montreal, said :—

“ We were now almost commercially dependent on the United States, and were dependent for access to the ocean on them. * * * *

“ The Railway would cost a good deal of money, but it was one of the unfortunate incidents of our position and a necessity for us.”

With these and similar opinions from the late Premier, Sir E. P. Tache, and Hon. Mr. Cartier, upon record, Mr. Tupper's statement at page 24 is hardly consistent with the fact, when

he says that the Inter-Colonial Railway "can only be obtained by union." The construction of the Railway was not made conditional upon a union of the Provinces when the Minute of Council was signed at Quebec by the Delegates in September, 1862. On the contrary, the question of Colonial Union, which was before the Convention, was dismissed as impracticable, before the agreement to build the road was signed. Now we are told that Canada "seeks, in Confederation, the means of obtaining access by railway to the ocean." If by "means" is meant the money which is to be extracted from the Maritime Provinces, the word is significant and appropriate. Viewed in any other sense it is puerile, if not something worse. Canada may, at this moment, if she can command the capital, obtain access to the ocean. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia are not foreign territories. They are, like herself, British Provinces, inhabited by people who would not only freely give the right of way, but aid her with their funds, if she would only build the railroad, and all the more cheerfully if they were not perplexed with this precious scheme of Confederation.

Mr. Tupper, knowing that an overwhelming majority of his own countrymen are opposed to his policy, is very anxious to escape from the consequence of an appeal to the electors of Nova Scotia, and throw the responsibility of passing an obnoxious measure, outraging the feelings of the people, upon the Parliament and the Government of this country. He may succeed in doing it, but I have my doubts. Let us see how the case stands. Mr. Tupper boasts that a large majority of the Nova Scotia Legislature passed a resolution authorizing the appointment of Delegates to arrange with the Imperial Government "a scheme of union which will ensure just provision for the rights and interests of this Province;" but he has omitted to state that petitions have since been signed by nearly if not quite two-thirds of the adult male population of the Province, praying that the Imperial Parliament "will defer all action in favour of Confederation, until the people of Nova Scotia shall have exercised and

"enjoyed their constitutional privilege to express their opinions "at the polls." The Nova Scotians, my Lord, do not object to the Delegates arranging with the Imperial Authorities any scheme of Government consistent with their rights and interests, provided that whatever measure is agreed on is sent back for the ratification of the Legislature and the people of the Province. This they claim as their inalienable right, a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and which they do not believe the Parliament of this country will rashly take away from one of the most loyal and prosperous Colonies of the Crown.

There is another view of this case to which Mr. Tupper has not ventured to refer. He has omitted to inform your Lordship that while Canada has legislated upon the Quebec scheme and adopted the resolutions passed at the Convention without the alteration of a single word, the resolution, under which he and his colleagues claim to represent Nova Scotia, was passed by the Assembly upon a distinct pledge given by Mr. Tupper himself that the Quebec scheme would be abandoned. The very gentleman who invited, and subsequently supported the resolution, so triumphantly referred to, declared that that scheme, "in some of its most important features," was "unjust to the people of the Maritime Provinces," and that the object of his movement was "to defeat the Quebec scheme." To which the Provincial Secretary replied, on behalf of the Government, that he met, "in all frankness the proposal" of the Hon. Member, and continued:—"We feel that difficulties have arisen in connection with the Quebec scheme, which require such an arrangement as has been proposed, in order to remove the objections that exist." It is clear, then, that the powers of the Nova Scotian Delegates are limited, and that they cannot, without breach of faith to their own Legislature, accept the Quebec scheme, which has been denounced as "unjust, in some of its most important features." The Canadian Government and Legislature, upon the other hand, have not left us in doubt what they intend to do. That the Quebec scheme is to be rigidly ad-

hered to, is apparent from the following extract from the official report of a Confederation debate in the Ottawa Parliament, on the 27th July last, several days after Mr. Tupper and his train left Nova Scotia upon their present mission :—

“Hon. Mr. Holton assumed that delegates from Canada would go to England to meet delegates from other Provinces to superintend the passage of the Imperial measure. He wanted then to know if our delegates would adhere strictly to the Quebec scheme, or if they would consent to any modifications.

“Hon. Mr. Brown said we had passed the Quebec scheme, and must abide by it.

“Atty.-Gen. MacDonald replied, that the provisions of the Quebec scheme, having received the sanction of both Canadian and Imperial Legislatures, it would be adhered to as it stood. *No change was contemplated by us.*

“Hon. Mr. Cauchon did not see any difficulty in the direction indicated by the members for Chateaugay and Cornwall. *Of course, it must be understood that the Quebec resolutions would not be changed.*

“Mr. Rankin saw no good in discussions such as this, seeing that the people of Canada, by a majority of its representatives, had already decided in favour of the Quebec scheme, and the Lower Provinces were committed to union. Thus the delegates can do nothing else in England but urge the Quebec scheme, and were only authorized to do that. They were not like members of Parliament with a general power, but delegates with a special limited authority.”

The Canadian Delegates, it is said, will be here in a few days, to take part in the Confederation conference, and no small amount of curiosity is excited as to the mode by which the differences of opinion, entertained by the Maritime and Canadian Legislatures, are to be reconciled. Mr. Tupper dare not accept the Quebec scheme, and the Canadians, without exceeding their powers, cannot accept any other. The Conference may possibly result in a compromise, but, whatever the result, the policy and duty of the Government of this country

is clear—to send the measure back to the several Colonies, with instructions to the Governor-General, and Lieutenant-Governors, to submit it for the approval of their respective Parliaments and people.

A rapid glance over the thirty pages of extracts which Mr. Tupper has strung together, will illustrate the value of the whole collection. He quotes three lines from a note, to shew that Judge Sewell proposed some scheme of Union in 1814, which the Duke of Kent approved. But will he tell us why the scheme was thrown into a pigeon-hole and forgotten for half-a-century? Simply because the Queen's father, though, as a gentleman bound to write a civil reply to a Judge, who had sent His Royal Highness a long paper, had no fancy for forming Confederacies, which must be Republics and nothing else. Assuming, however, that the Duke of Kent would, if alive now, favour the policy; the questions for Mr. Tupper to answer, before the people of England, are, would His Royal Highness attempt to break up the Empire, to form out of the fragments of his daughter's sovereignty a new nation, and would he, or Judge Sewell either, attempt to coerce the people of the Provinces into such an experiment, without the law by which their Institutions were to be changed and their future moulded, having been submitted for their acceptance or rejection?

The long extract from the Earl of Durham's report, may be disposed of with as much ease. The whole aim and object of the Earl of Durham, after a deliberate survey of the condition of the Colonies, was to confer self-government upon them all. Lord Durham favoured a "comprehensive union," — if it could be arranged, but what did he say? "I know of but one difficulty in the way of such a union, and that arises from the disinclination which some of the Lower Provinces might feel to the transference of powers from their present Legislatures to that of the Union." Let us suppose that Lord Durham were alive now, and could survey the Provinces all flourishing and prosperous under the system of self-government, which

grew out of his report. Would he break it down? Would he arbitrarily transfer the powers wisely exercised for a quarter of a century, and tie the Provinces together by a law which had never been reviewed by their Legislatures, or accepted by their people?

What Mr. Tupper proposes to prove by quoting the opinions of the British American League, a rather miscellaneous collection of eccentric persons, who assembled at Toronto in 1849, it is difficult to discover, seeing that, in the very extract he gives from their proceedings, they propose that the Confederacy to be formed should have "a Secretary and Office in Downing Street," and that "the Members of the Legislative Council should be elected;" and although we are told that the second proposition was reconsidered, it is quite apparent that the Leaguers and the Quebec Convention were not quite in accord, and if they were, nobody knows better than Mr. Tupper that the proceedings of this Toronto gathering never produced any effect in the Maritime Provinces, but were laughed at in them all.

Mr. Tupper quotes two or three short passages from Mr. Howe's speech on the "Organization of the Empire," made in 1854, with the very disingenuous object of proving the very reverse of what the whole speech, taken together, does prove. That speech occupied four hours in the delivery, and was republished in England in 1855. It contains a multitude of facts, skilfully arranged, to illustrate the territorial extent, industrial, commercial, social, financial and political condition of British America. Addressing himself to the enquiry which created the debate, What was to be the future of this great country? Mr. Howe discussed with the most perfect frankness all the modes by which British America might achieve a higher status. We may join the United States, said he, but it would be an act of dishonour and a breach of allegiance to do this; and besides, it would not be for our interest, because thirty millions of people can never offer us the same wide markets and elevated companionship that we now

derive from being associated with two hundred and thirty millions, commanding points of vantage in every quarter of the globe. "We may," said the speaker, "form ourselves into a nation under a combined Legislative or Federal system, but if we do we shall withdraw from an Empire, peopled by hundreds of millions, and unite our fortunes with two and a half millions of people, with an exposed frontier of fifteen hundred miles, and with no fleets and armies to protect our sea coast." Both these propositions—the formation of a "New Nation," and Annexation to the United States, were, after a deliberate review of the advantages and disadvantages, rejected by Mr. Howe in 1854 as emphatically as he rejects them now. What did he propose? Just what, after twelve years' reflection, he proposes now, that the Provinces should seek a realization of all their aspirations in a more intimate and close connection with the Empire; and by claiming for their youth distinctions not only provincial but imperial, in the naval, military and civil service of the Crown. Nobody knows this better than Mr. Tupper, and yet he quotes two or three brief extracts from a long speech, which your Lordship may never have read, in order to prove that Mr. Howe either did favour or might have favoured this Quebec scheme of Confederation, the principles of which were as completely repudiated in 1854 as they are in 1866.

Mr. Tupper endeavours to shew, by two or three other extracts, that while Mr. Howe has often contended that the more distinguished men trained in the Colonies, should be drawn into the service of the Empire, he is inconsistent in opposing that part of the Quebec scheme, which provides for the selection of Governors for the Maritime Provinces. Mr. Howe, I have good reasons for knowing, thinks now, as he has ever thought, that Her Majesty's Government might find, in the outlying portions of the Empire, able Governors, and energetic men for counsel and for action in all departments of government, and that they would "do the State some service" if they were more frequently employed. But he has never con-

templated that the power of selection and appointment should be transferred from London to Ottawa; from the Queen to some persons in Canada, who may appoint men that have not only won no distinction in the broad arenas of national competition, but who may have earned the contempt of the very Provinces they are sent to govern, by mean compliance and political subserviency. If honoured by his Sovereign with the government of one of her Colonies, Mr. Howe might regard the appointment as a distinction. If selected by some persons to whom it is proposed to transfer the patronage, he would probably ask to be excused.

But, it is said, that Mr. Howe, on several occasions, has talked about British North America, some time or another, becoming a nation, and Mr. Tupper asks, with an air of triumph, if he did not mean this, what did he mean? The answer is very simple, that Mr. Howe has laboured, as few others have, to elevate and combine all the Provinces of British America, and might reasonably have looked forward to the time when, preserving the Institutions they have, they would agree to create some central authority, with limited powers, for Inter-Colonial purposes. But it is quite clear that, in September, 1862, in common with all the Delegates at Quebec, he thought that even a discussion of the subject was premature; and surely in 1866, in view of the military and naval power of the United States, with a good many new causes of irritation and complication to "give us pause," he can hardly be blamed if he wishes for some assurance of stability, before he begins to try new political experiments.

Mr. Tupper thinks that we should set public opinion in the United States at defiance, and carry out the national aspirations of the Quebec Convention at all hazards. Perhaps we should, were the honour of the Crown or the interests of the Empire involved in the matter; but as nobody's interests are at stake, except those of a few persons who egregiously mistook the temper and feelings of the Provinces they represented, is it worth while, just when our neighbours are smarting with wrongs, real

or imaginary, and in no humour to take a just and generous view of our proceedings, to increase the irritation and risks of war, by building up "fresh powers" beside them? A man may have the right to wear his red comforter, and a bull be an unreasonable animal to object to it, but it may be wisdom at times for the man to put the comforter in his pocket. Mr. Tupper is very valiant, but if war breaks out, he belongs to the non-combative portion of the army, and will only have to cut off the limbs that are shattered, while John Bull must pay the bill. I trust Her Majesty's Government will not be so unwise as to attempt to ignore the existence of a great people, or to offer them, at a very inappropriate season, needless offence.

Mr. Tupper treats us to a dissertation on the power of Parliament, and furnishes extracts from Blackstone and May: but nobody denies the power of the Imperial Parliament to sweep away the Constitution of a Colony, should the preservation of the national life or the great interests of Empire demand the sacrifice. In such a case, flagrant abuse, corruption, or insubordination, must be shown; or the existence of a high state necessity, in presence of which all ordinary safeguards of existing institutions should give way. In this case, however, it is admitted that there has been no abuse or any other cause of forfeiture. Where is the state necessity? It only exists in the heads of certain persons who manufactured a crude scheme of government two years ago, which nobody in Great Britain asked for, and which none of the Maritime Provinces would accept; and who now desire the Imperial Parliament to strain its high powers, and forfeit the respect of the civilized world, by an act of confiscation and coercion of the most arbitrary kind, for which there is neither precedent nor necessity.

A word or two now as to the mode in which Mr. Tupper seeks to abuse the advantage, which a resolution of the Legislature of Nova Scotia for the moment gives him. Locke, in his great work on Government, says:

"The Legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to

any other hands. For it being only delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The *people alone* can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the Legislative and appointing in whose hands it shall be. And when the people have said we will submit to Rules and be governed by *Law*, made by such men and in such forms, nobody else can say other men shall make *Laws* for them. Nor can the people be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the Legislature, being derived from the people by positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws--and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and placing it in other hands."

Now, will Mr. Tupper explain what right the Parliament of Nova Scotia had to transfer to him and five other gentlemen, the powers of Legislation during the recess, which the three branches of the Legislature in session could only exercise; and how, even the Parliament assembled, could, without the consent of the people, undertake to exceed their powers and "make Legislators" instead of laws, and "transfer the power of making laws to other hands."

These are questions of great delicacy and importance, my Lord, and they lie at the foundation of our whole Colonial system. If a Resolution, passed by a chance majority, obtained by any means in a Colony, can invest half-a-dozen persons with authority to remodel or overthrow its constitution, let this new doctrine be clearly understood. Before it is propounded, however, not only should the Law officers of the Crown be consulted, but we ought to be favoured with the opinions of the Constitutional Lawyers in both Houses of Parliament.

While Lord Monck and his Canadian advisers are bent upon forming a "new nation," Mr. Tupper and his friends from the Maritime Provinces evidently contemplate no such thing, or if they do are acting discreetly till the money part of the arrangement is secure. Now, my Lord, it appears to

me that this question should be decided before we advance one step. Is this Confederacy, when formed, to be a Nation or a Colony? and when that point has been decided, Her Majesty's Government will be in a condition to determine two or three questions that come next in order whatever be the decision. If the thing is still to be a Colony, what do we gain by sowing discontent where peace reigns, and by creating a great unwieldy Confederacy, that no skill can govern wisely, and that will brook no restraint? If it is to be a Nation, then we ought to be told frankly what our relations are to be to the Mother Country and to the rest of the world. When these questions have been decided we shall be in a position to start fair and know exactly what we are about. Until they are, "shadows, clouds, and darkness" rest upon the horizon, and nobody can see his way clear.

But Mr. Tupper is afraid that Nova Scotia will be nothing but a "Gibraltar for Great Britain," and reduced "to a position of isolation," if she is not dragged into this hopeful Confederacy. Let him be assured. While Nova Scotia is surrounded by the sea, with open harbours all the winter, with four thousand vessels lading and unlading in every seaport in the world; while her people are in full commercial, political, and social communion with hundreds of millions of British subjects in every part of the globe, to say nothing of the hundreds of millions of foreigners whose markets will be open to them, while the diplomacy of England is successful and her fleets can command the ocean, Nova Scotia can never be isolated; and as to which destiny her people prefer, the facts under my hand are the best refutation of Mr. Tupper's assertions. One of the London papers, a few weeks ago, summed up all the petitions in favour of an extension of the franchise as about half a million, or one in sixty of the entire population of these Islands, and these were regarded as unmistakeable evidence of the popularity of the measure. Now when it can be shown that one in nine of the population of Nova Scotia have not only repudiated Mr. Tupper's policy,

but have actually signed petitions praying to be protected from this scheme of Confederation, the value of such a demonstration will be readily understood. One in nine of the population would give more than three millions of signatures for this country, and I think I may venture to say that no such appeal as that has ever been made in the long course of its political history.

I have the honor to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient,
Very humble Servant,

WILLIAM ANNAND.

25, SAVILLE Row,
6 November, 1866.

